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Abstract 
The current industrial energy saving practice in China mostly relies on administrative controls and administrative 
orders means, and its efficiency and benefit is at a low level. One reason is that information asymmetry exists 
between the government's energy management and enterprises’ energy -saving conducting. This article focuses on the 
game between the government and enterprises in the government- dominated industrial model of energy-saving, 
analyzing the effect that the government’s checking, penalty and reward policies, and transformation cost have done 
on enterprises’ energy-saving behaviour, and put forward some policy-making suggestions.  
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1. Introduction 
The current industrial energy saving activities in China mostly relies on admin istrative controls and 
administrative orders. The government fo rces industrial enterprises to reach their energy saving targets by 
measures such as target responsibility system, accountability, one-vote-down system and rules-violat ion 
fines and etc.For example, in the second half of the year 2010, some local governments have conducted 
power rationing to force enterprises to reduce energy consumption for the purpose of reach ing the energy 
saving target of “the eleventh five-year plan”. Th is administrative type of energy -saving model is 
comparatively low in efficiency and economic profit. The reasons are as follows: 
First, industrial energy saving is a complex matter[1].Industrial energy-saving management covers the 
whole process of product life cycle, which ranges from product design, raw materials, fuels and 
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equipment procurement, production, product market ing and product recycling, disposal and reuse. The 
implementation and effect of energy saving activities are bound to be subjected to internal factors of 
enterprises such as energy saving technology, production technology, equipment, raw materials, 
management system and enterprise culture, as well as external factors such as government energy -saving 
policy, energy prices, energy-saving information and social evaluation. 
Second, Information asymmetry exists between the administrative energy-saving management and 
corporate energy saving behaviour. The government, as an energy-saving administrator, can compile by 
legislation means (making some laws and regulations), energy–guzzling enterprises to conduct energy 
saving transformat ions. But in  practice, enterprises tend to have more informat ion than the government, 
which often places the government in an asymmetrical status in acquisition of industrial energy saving 
informat ion. Restricted by its insufficient knowledge of enterprises’ resources, patterns of energy 
consumption and energy conservation potential, and limited by the cost of supervision, audit and checking, 
by some enterprises’ intentional concealing behaviors, the government is not in  the position to know 
everything about what they really do in reducing energy consumption. Besides, enterprises may also set 
their energy-saving goals at too low a level, and thus hinder the energy conservation process of the whole 
society. Or they may overstate the difficult ies they encounter so as to less perform, or even not to fulfill 
their responsibilities and obligations in energy-saving. 
This article is to focus on a detailed analysis of the game between the government and enterprises in 
the government-dominated industrial energy-saving model.  
2. An analysis of the game between the government and enterprises  
Based on the status of the government and enterprises in energy conservation activities, th ere are 
assumptions as follows: 
(1) The players, the government and enterprises, both are pursuing utility maximizat ion. 
(2) There are two  kinds of act ion strategies for enterprises: active and inactive. Here  "active" means 
enterprises actively response to government requirements, and do their best to take measures for energy 
conservation and emissions reduction. And "inactive" points to the fact that enterprises negatively treat 
government’s regulating requirements for fear o f the rise in costs in operation, and as a result, fail to reach 
energy conservation and emission reduction targets. The probability fo r enterprises to actively adopt 
energy conservation action is y, and the probability for them to take inactive actions is (1 - y). 
 (3) C stands for the investment cost for enterprises to carry out positive energy conservation activities 
(updating and upgrading the existing equipment and technology, introducing new equipment and 
technology, or training personnel, etc.)S stands for the expenses saved as a result of enterprises’ positive 
energy conservation actions suppose the cost for enterprises to take "passive" actions is 0.  
 (4) Government action strategies fall into two kinds: checking; no-checking. Probability for checking 
is x; for no-checking is 1 - x. 
 (5) C is the supervision cost for the government to evaluate how well enterprises do in reaching their 
energy conservation and emission reduction targets. Enterprises completing  the energy-saving index set 
by the government can obtain governmental reward J, which are mostly given in the form of financial 
subsidies or preferential. If companies fail to reach their energy-saving index will suffer from fines, and 
that is F   
See the following the matrixes: 
Table 1    enterprise and government profit matrix 
 checking˄x˅ No-checking˄1-x˅ 
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active(y) -D+J+S           -C-J -D+S            0 
inactive˄1-y˅ 
-F               -C+F 0                 0 
From the above matrix, it can be seen that the so-called pure strategy Nash equilibrium, which  is of 
bilateral benefit does not exist. So here we are to analyze the Mixed strategy Nash equilib rium in the two-
side game. 
The government's predicted profit is: 
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This is the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution in the game between the government and 
enterprises in energy conservation and emission reduction. 
The formula (1) reveals that, the greater F is, the greater y* is. That is, the greater the penalt ies that 
substandard enterprises are imposed upon, the more likely the enterprises are to carry out actively energy 
conservation activities. On the other hand, the smaller y* is, the bigger J should be. That is, the less likely  
an enterprise is to reach its energy conservation and emission reduction targets, the more reward should be 
given to the enterprise that has completed its. Only in this way, can the government stimulate enterprises 
to take more active measures.The smaller C (the government's checking cost) is, the greater y*(the 
probability of an  is enterprise to carry out actively  energy conservation activities) is. As s maller checking 
cost implies that the government possesses more information about how l an enterprise’s energy 
conservation activities and energy-saving attempts are going on, it is less possible fo r it to hide energy -
consumption information and react  inactively  to the government’s compulsory energy–saving goal. In a 
more well-informed environment, is less likely to see the failure of the energy saving and emission 
reduction policy, which is often the consequence of informat ion asymmetry. Complete informat ion is able 
to promote the market integrity, and thus further promote the efficiency of the on -going economy and that 
of energy saving and emission reduction as well. 
The formula (2) reveals that, the more capital D is invested by an enterprise in reaching its energy-
saving targets, the bigger the government’s inspection x * will be. The government needs to increase the 
checking intensity and frequency, to urge the enterprise to conduct its energy conservation activities. 
When the government increase the re ward for the enterprises doing well in energy conservation as well as 
the penalty for those failing to arrive their targets, the x* of the government becomes smaller. The more 
expenses saved in energy saving actions (S), the more active and spontaneous ent erprises are, the smaller 
the government’s probability of inspection will be. 
3. Policy-making Suggestions 
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From the above equilibrium condition, it is evident that industrial energy -saving are affected by and 
subjected to many kinds of factors. Therefore, at present, in the government-dominated mode of energy 
saving, energy saving measures made by the government must be of diversity and comprehensiveness in 
order to achieve a win-win effect.  
First, to establish a scientific and reasonable economic incentive mechanism to reduce the energy 
saving cost of enterprises . 
From the game analysis above, it  can be seen that, if the government increases its reward  for the 
enterprises who have finished their energy-saving index, the other ones whose probability of reaching its 
energy saving and emission reduction targets ( y ) is low, can be stimulated to adopt more positive 
measures. In industrial energy saving activities, there exists a typical client-agent relat ionship between the 
government and the enterprises. Restricted to supervision and audit costs, and the complexity of industrial 
enterprises’ energy-saving practice, it is not possible for the government to know everything industrial 
enterprises have or have not done in reducing energy consumption. So, in energy - saving transformation, 
enterprises run the moral risk of hid ing their behaviors and informat ion asymmetry exists between the 
government and enterprises. Thus, it is necessary for the government, as the client, to establish scientific 
and reasonable economic incentives, encouraging the enterprise to cut down energy saving cost and 
actively participate in energy saving transformation. Ma Aiying’s (2008)[2] studies reveal that China's 
energy saving incentive policies are hysteretic, s mall in scope and less p owerful in  regulat ions making. 
Therefore, a  reasonable choice of the most effective combinations of economic incentive tools and of 
operation modes to maximize the combined benefits is one of the long-acting mechanisms to promote 
industries’ energy-saving initiative.  
Second, to set up a mechanism of the third party information disclosure to achieve the information 
openness of energy- saving. 
From the above game analysis between enterprises and the government, it is evident that in a more 
well-informed environment, failure probability of energy conservation and emission reduction policies 
caused by incomplete or asymmetrical information will be greatly reduced. 
Complete informat ion is able to promote the market integrity, and thus further promote the efficie ncy 
of the on-going economy and that of energy saving and emission reduction  as well. A report system of 
disclosing information and a system of public part icipation should be set up to arouse the public's 
enthusiasm in participation and put the sporadic social forces together to achieve the common goal. 
Thus, Energy-saving informat ion is to be released not only by the enterprise itself and the government, 
but also by the third-party organization.Liu  bin’s (2009) [3]studies indicate that the third party’s 
informat ion release has exerted more and more influence on energy-saving practice in the international 
scope. On the one hand, more and more in formation from enterprises is mostly released by the third party, 
and on the other hand, public information is mostly collected and integrated by third party organizations 
as feedback to enterprises.  
As in the case of Japan Energy Conservation Center, it is the largest and most authoritative 
organization, releasing enterprise informat ion about energy consumption, energy saving, energy saving 
equipment and technology, etc. JECC, as a third- party informat ion provider besides the government and 
the enterprise, plays a tremendous role in the advance and rapid  development of Japan's energy 
conservation practice. 
Third, to improve the scientificity and accuracy of the government’s evaluation on enterprises’ energy 
conservation and emissions reduction  
Only when the government increases its checking efficacy, takes advantage of reasonable but effect ive 
rewards and punishment, strengthens its policy prestige degree, can enterprises’ energy conservation and 
emissions reduction be achieved.HuangXin etc’s (2008) [4]studies prove that enterprises’ intention of 
energy conservation and emission reduction tends to fall with the govern ment supervision frequency 
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increases, as too harsh supervision can do nothing good but increase enterprises’ management costs (such 
as frequent spot checks or energy audit will add to personnel and financial expenditure), which may lead 
to some deceptive behaviors of enterprises. Therefore, it is advised to make full use of technological 
means to reduce the checking cost of the government and enterprises, and improve work efficiency for the 
purpose of making the government’s evaluation scientific and accura te. The more acute, more better the 
government is at recognizing fraud or ineffective actions, the more down-to-earth, more serious, and more 
productive enterprises’ work for energy conservation and emissions reduction will be. 
Fourth, to reinforce the voluntary agreement actions of energy-saving to improve enterprises’ initiative 
In the traditional government leading practice of energy conservation and emission reduction, the 
government and enterprises always play the game of cat and mouse, only to find en ergy- saving efficiency 
and benefit not rarely satisfactory.  
Voluntary agreement model of energy-saving, with its non-obligatory nature, is easy for enterprises to 
accept, and as a result, can arouse enterprises’ enthusiasm and in itiative in  environmental  protection. 
Enterprises can decide on their own energy saving behavior, and therefore, are willing to make known 
their true ideas and set their own attainable goals. Voluntary agreement pattern of energy saving is to help 
enterprises and the local government gain win-win economic benefits and environmental benefits.It can 
also bring about changes in enterprises’ concept of management. Enterprises are willing to bring 
environmental consideration into the making of their own management system, which is to ma ke their 
management and decisions more scientific and feasible. Voluntary agreement of energy-saving is still a  
new thing in China. It is one of the long-acting mechanisms to  ensure autonomous energy saving 
behaviors to explore some supporting policies (in tax, technology and finance), ways of evaluation, 
standardization of the form of agreement. 
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